Fang v. Showa Entetsu Co.11/20/2003
ested in the complaint or at trial, constituted a new request, not a motion under C.R.C.P. 59(e)); see also Pagosa Lakes Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Caywood, 973 P.2d 698, 703 (Colo. App. 1998)(even when the complaint does not request attorney fees, if such an award is authorized by statute based on the achievement of a successful result and is for services in conjunction with the litigation, the propriety of the award may be determined after the litigation is completed and the result known).
Here, according to the record, defendants had ample opportunity to challenge plaintiff's entitlement to fees. The entire trial focused on whether plaintiff was entitled to receive his severance payment. And, posttrial, each party fully briefed, argued, and presented evidence on the issues whether plaintiff could be awarded fees under the CWCA and, if so, whether those fees were reasonable.
Township Homeowners Ass'n v. Arapahoe Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 844 P.2d 1316 (Colo. App. 1992), on which defendants rely, instead supports plaintiff's position. In that case, the trial court awarded attorney fees to the defendants under ยง 13-17-101, et seq., C.R.S. 2003, because the plaintiff presented no evidence to justify its request for attorney fees set forth in the complaint. In reversing that award, the division concluded that a general request for attorney fees in the prayer clause of a complaint is not a claim for relief that could be frivolous or groundless, but merely provides notice that such fees may be sought, depending on the outcome of the case. Similarly, here, plaintiff's request for fees in his prayer for relief sufficiently apprised defendants that, if plaintiff successfully received his severance pay, attorney fees might be sought.
III.
Finally, defendants contend the trial court erred by failing to proportionately reduce the award of attorney fees because of a trial continuance. We disagree.
The determination of the reasonableness of attorney fees is a question of fact for the trial court, and its ruling will not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous or not supported by the evidence. In awarding attorney fees, a trial court may consider several factors, including (1) the amount in controversy; (2) the time required to effectively represent the client; (3) the complexity of the case; (4) the value of the legal services to the client; and (5) the customary practice in the legal community regarding fees in similar cases. Porter v. Castle Rock Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 895 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Colo. App. 1995).
Here, the continuance, to which the parties stipulated, was necessitated because of plaintiff's medical emergency. The trial was rescheduled, and in the interim, plaintiff's first trial counsel retired.
Although defendants emphasize that the continuance was due to no fault of their own, we agree with plaintiff that, under the circumstances here, that fact was irrelevant to the determination of a reasonable fee. Moreover, although defendants argued that the replacement of plaintiff's first trial counsel resulted in duplicate billing, plaintiff presented expert testimony that all the requested fees were reasonable, that counsel always must again prepare for trial whenever a trial is continued, and that the expert saw no repeat billings due to the continuance.
We conclude that the court was not required to reduce the award because of the continuance. Moreover, the record supports the trial court's other factual determinations concerning reasonableness. Thus, we find no basis for reversal. See Porter v. Castle Rock Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., supra.
Based on our disposition, we need not a
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