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Taylor v. Law Offices of Brookens and Associates11/12/2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
Plaintiff and appellant Frank Taylor (Taylor) sued his former attorneys, defendants and respondents Armand Thruston (Thruston) and Larry Brookens, doing business as the Law Offices of Larry Brookens and Associates (Brookens). After Taylor presented his evidence at a court trial, the defendants moved for and obtained judgment in their favor. On appeal, Taylor asserts trial court bias and errors related to the denial of his motion for summary judgment, the withdrawal of his trial counsel, and the defendants' alleged failure to comply with local rules. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Taylor, represented by Thruston and Brookens, sued his former employer for discrimination and received a monetary settlement. Taylor then hired attorney Austen Pell (Pell) and on June 6, 2001, filed the instant action against his former attorneys, claiming that they had committed professional negligence, intentionally inflicted emotional distress, and breached their fiduciary duties to him while representing him in the employment discrimination action.
In January 2002, the trial court scheduled the trial for June 24, 2002, and the final status conference for June 11, 2002.
During the course of the litigation, Taylor and his counsel experienced what Pell described as "a complete breakdown of the attorney/client relationship." On February 15, 2002, Pell filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. At the April 3, 2002 hearing on Pell's motion to withdraw, the trial court found that Taylor, although present in court, had not been given proper notice of the hearing. The trial court told Taylor that if Taylor opposed Pell's motion to withdraw, the motion would be denied without prejudice. Alternatively, if Taylor consented to the withdrawal, the court would grant the motion. Because Taylor opposed the motion to withdraw, the trial court denied it without prejudice. The court advised Taylor to hire new counsel, stating that it would likely grant a withdrawal motion that was properly noticed and served.
As the trial court anticipated, Pell soon refiled his motion to withdraw. Pell served Taylor with a new motion on April 18, 2002, and filed it on April 24, 2002. The hearing was scheduled for May 28, 2002.
On April 22, 2002, Taylor-personally, not through his counsel of record-filed a motion for summary judgment to be heard May 23, 2002. As of the May 23 hearing, Taylor had not signed a consent to substitution of counsel, nor had Pell's second motion to withdraw yet been heard. The trial court explained to Taylor that he could not rule on the summary judgment motion because represented parties may not conduct litigation personally. The court said, " ou opposed his motion to be relieved as your attorney of record so I denied the motion, and he remains your attorney of record. [ ] . . . [ ] There's an easy way to resolve that problem. There's a form called `substitution of attorney' that you can substitute him out and you in. You need his signature and yours [-] or you can have him refile the motion."
Pell's motion to withdraw was granted by the court on May 28, 2002, over what appeared to be Taylor's continuing opposition. At the withdrawal motion hearing, Taylor asked when his summary judgment motion would be heard. The court reminded Taylor that his motion had not been proper
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