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Buenrostro v. Enterprises11/13/2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
Maria Buenrostro appeals from the judgment for Guckenheimer Enterprises after Guckenheimer's motion for summary judgment was granted on Buenrostro's claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.; hereafter FEHA) for pregnancy discrimination, and for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. We reverse.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Buenrostro began work as a payroll administrator at Guckenheimer in June 1997. Her duties included inputting personnel data, such as pay rate changes, pay adjustments, garnishments and changes in employment status, for Guckenheimer employees in specific geographic regions. Performance of those duties required her to communicate frequently with managers at Guckenheimer facilities in her designated regions.
In August 1997, Buenrostro notified Guckenheimer she was pregnant. She took a six-week leave of absence for that pregnancy in February 1998, returning to work at Guckenheimer in April 1998. In April 2001, Buenrostro informed Guckenheimer that she was again pregnant and planned to take a leave of absence beginning in August 2001. Buenrostro's employment with Guckenheimer was terminated on May 11, 2001.
Buenrostro's complaint alleged that despite her satisfactory job performance and Guckenheimer's need for workers with her qualifications, her employment was terminated because she was female and pregnant. Guckenheimer moved for summary judgment, asserting that Buenrostro was terminated because of insubordination and unsatisfactory job performance, not her pregnancy. In opposition, Buenrostro offered evidence to show that Guckenheimer's stated reasons for her termination, poor attitude and performance, were untrue pretexts, and that the real reason for the termination was her pregnancy. The trial court found Buenrostro unable to raise a triable issue of material fact. It determined she had not introduced enough evidence to dispute that job performance was Guckenheimer's reason for termination.
II. Discussion
Buenrostro argues that the judgment must be reversed because triable issues of fact exist regarding Guckenheimer's reason for terminating her.
1. Law
Summary judgment is properly granted when "all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860.) For purposes of our review, "the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom must be accepted as true." (Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 138, 148.)
FEHA prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of an employee's pregnancy. (Gov. Code, § 12945.) To address claims brought under FEHA, California courts look to federal law interpreting the analogous title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. (Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 195.)
To prevail on a claim for pregnancy discrimination, an individual must ultimately prove that he or she received an adverse employment decision because of pregnancy. However, direct evidence of discr
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