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Wal-Mart Stores10/30/2003
In this matter we hold that an employee who files a workers' compensation claim seeking benefits for an injury to the psyche which derives from the effects of an admitted routine physical injury, cannot recover unless the employee has worked for the employer for at least six months. As the Board ruled otherwise, we annul the order under review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The petition involves an issue of law, and the factual details may therefore be omitted. Velta Elaine Garcia ("Applicant") suffered an admitted orthopedic injury to her back while employed by Wal-Mart ("Employer") in February of 1995. At the time, she had worked for Employer for less than six months. Applicant had back surgery and has not returned to work.
Some four years after the incident, Applicant amended her workers' compensation claim to assert that she had suffered damage to her psyche resulting from the disability caused by the orthopedic injury. The workers' compensation judge ruled that she was not entitled to compensation benefits with respect to the claimed psychiatric injury because it was barred by the "six-month" rule of Labor Code section 3208.3, subdivision (d). (See infra.) The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board ("Board"), however, reversed this decision, finding that the statute did not apply to Applicant's claim, and the Board remanded the case to the referee for further proceedings. Employer petitioned for a writ of review, which we granted.
DISCUSSION
Although factual determinations of the Board are entitled to substantial deference (Western Growers Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 227, 233), the issue before us is one of law, which we review de novo. (Land v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 491, 494.)
Subdivision (d) of section 3208.3 provides that " otwithstanding any other provision of this division, no compensation shall be paid pursuant to this division for a psychiatric injury related to a claim against an employer unless the employee has been employed by that employer for at least six months. . . . This subdivision shall not apply if the psychiatric injury is caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment condition." The statute, which contains other provisions governing and to some extent limiting benefits for psychiatric claims, was enacted in 1989. It was designed to address public and legislative concerns about, inter alia, "the proliferation of workers' compensation cases with claims for psychiatric injuries." (Hansen v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1183-1184.) Subdivision (d) of section 3208.3 was enacted two years later, with the apparent purpose of "limit questionable claims for psychiatric injuries resulting from routine stress during the first six months of employment." (Id. at p. 1184.) As enacted, the subdivision also included the language "Nothing in this section shall be construed to mean that there shall not be compensability for any psychiatric injury which is related to any physical injury in the workplace." This language, however, was deleted in 1993.
Given the overall intent of section 3208.3, there has been some debate over its effective scope-that is, whether it really applied to all claims for psychiatric injuries, including those which were related to undisputed physical injury. Some of these questions were answered in Lockheed Martin, supra, which involved the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) requiring the employee claiming injury to the psyche to establish that the "actual events of employment were predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury." (Italics added.) The claimant in that case had suffere
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