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Quintana v. Gibson11/6/2003
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
Plaintiff and appellant Michael Quintana appeals from a postjudgment order granting a motion for entry of satisfaction of judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Gregg Whitaker Gibson in this action for damages arising from an automobile accident.
Plaintiff's medical expenses were paid by his employer's workers' compensation insurer. Defendant's liability insurer paid the workers' compensation lien and offered to settle with Plaintiff for $5,000, which Plaintiff accepted. Judgment was entered pursuant to the settlement agreement. Defendant's liability insurer mailed Plaintiff a check for the difference between the amount of the settlement and the amount of the workers' compensation lien ($2,146). Plaintiff refused to accept the check. Defendant demanded Plaintiff accept the check in full satisfaction of the judgment. Plaintiff refused to sign an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment. Defendant moved for an order for entry of satisfaction of judgment. The trial court granted Defendant's motion.
Plaintiff contends Defendant failed to comply with the demand requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050 prior to moving for entry of satisfaction of judgment. Defendant argues that a noticed motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050 is not the sole method of obtaining an order for entry of satisfaction of judgment. In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude the noticed motion procedure set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050 is the exclusive method for obtaining an order for entry of satisfaction of judgment, but Defendant's failure to comply with the procedure did not result in any prejudice to Plaintiff under the facts of this case. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we address Plaintiff's remaining contentions, including his contention that Defendant was required to pay a proportionate share of Plaintiff's attorney fees under the common fund doctrine. We affirm on condition that Defendant pay his proportionate share of Plaintiff's attorney fees.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 30, 2000, Plaintiff was driving in the course and scope of his employment when he was injured in a collision with Defendant's car. Plaintiff's medical expenses were paid by his employer's workers' compensation insurer Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.
On March 2, 2001, the workers' compensation insurer wrote a letter to Defendant's automobile liability insurer Allstate Indemnity Company stating: "Please be advised [we are] paying Worker[s'] Compensation benefits on the above captioned claim, pursuant to California's Workers' Compensation Laws. [ ] [We have] established a lien, under section 3852, of the California Worker[s'] Compensation Laws, and will expect full reimbursement for any and all monies expended on this claim, once any settlement or award is made." The workers' compensation insurer paid Plaintiff's total medical expenses of $2,854. On August 16, 2001, Defendant's insurer sent a check to the workers' compensation insurer for $1,832.45 as "final settlement of any and all liens and claims arising out of 8/30/00 loss involving [Plaintiff.]"
On August 24, 2001, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant and another individual for damages arising out of the accident. Plaintiff alleged that he had suffered wage loss, loss of use of property, hospital and medical expenses, general damage, property damage and loss of earning capacity for which he requested compensatory damages. On August 31, 2001, Defendant's insurer sent a letter to Plaintiff's attorney asking for a copy of the complaint. In addition, Defendant's insurer wrote, "
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