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Gulmire v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.12/23/2003
Introduction as if that protected person was the only one named there; and
_ separately to each other protected person.
However, the limit of coverage shown in the Coverage Summary is shared by all protected persons. ...
The separation clause takes effect after an individual has been declared a protected person. In other words, the separation clause does not create or extend coverage to a protected person; that is the function of the "Who Is Protected Under This Agreement" section. Instead, the separation provision only concerns how the particular protected person is to be treated throughout the policy.
. The issue here concerns how the separation provision operates. We construe insurance policies "to give effect to the intent of the parties, expressed in the language of the policy itself." Danbeck v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI 91, , 245 Wis. 2d 186, 629 N.W.2d 150. We interpret the policy's language from the standpoint of a reasonable insured. Id. "Where the language of the policy is plain and unambiguous, we enforce it as written, without resort to rules of construction or principles in case law." Id.
. The plain language of the separation provision indicates it effectively creates several policies from the original policy. The first clause of the separation provision deals with the protected persons named in the introduction. These are the named insureds: Sheriff, Fox Valley Auto Wholesale and Fox Valley Auto Auction. The separation provision applies the policy to each named insured as if that insured was the only named insured. That is, if all three of the named insureds sought coverage under the policy, the separation provision would literally sever the agreement into three distinct policies, one for Sheriff, another for Fox Valley Wholesale, and the final to Fox Valley Auction. The limits of coverage, though, would not be multiplied by the severance.
. The second clause of the separation provision states that the agreement will be applied "separately to each other protected person." Klister is an "other protected person"; hence, he falls within this clause. The term "separately" is not defined in the policy. Because we interpret insurance policies from the standpoint of a reasonable insured, we look to the ordinary lay dictionary to determine what a reasonable insured would understand this term to mean. See Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 745, 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990) ("When determining the ordinarily understood meaning of a word or phrase, it is appropriate to look to definitions in a recognized dictionary.").
. "Separately" means "in a separate manner : individually, independently," Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2070 (unabr. 1993), and "separate" means "to set or keep apart : detach." Id. at 2069. Therefore, Klister is treated in an independent manner such that he is detached from all other protected persons. Like the named insureds being treated individually as if each was the only named insured, each other protected person is also treated in the same manner; that is, as if that protected person was the only named insured. Consequently, Klister is treated as if he was the named insured in his own policy. With this conclusion at hand, we now turn to the exclusions.
C. Exclusions
1. The Fellow Employee Exclusion
. St. Paul first raises the fellow employee exclusion. The exclusion states:
We won't cover bodily injury to a fellow employee of any protected person arising out of and in the course of the fellow employee's employment by you.
It is undisputed that Gulmire was a fellow employee of Klister and that he
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