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Local 514 Transport Workers Union of America v. Keating12/16/2003
, under the Supremacy Clause.
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 , 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000), (emphasis added).
One hornbook explains: "The supremacy clause mandates that federal law overrides, i.e., preempts, any state regulation where there is an actual conflict between the two sets of legislation." J. Nowak & R. Rotunda, Constitutional Law, 319 (5th Ed. 1995). Preempted state law is struck down as unconstitutional - it violates the supremacy clause of the U. S. Constitution. In Crosby, the application was unconstitutional, as in the present case before us. It is the partial application of state law that is preempted and thus unconstitutional.
On appeal the Tenth Circuit Court has certified to us the following questions:
1. Is severability analysis required in light of the preemption of [Okla. Const.] article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(C), and § 1A(E) (insofar as it enforces § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5), and § 1A(C)) as to workers covered by the NLRA, as opposed to the "invalidation" of those provisions?
2. If severability analysis is appropriate, are § 1A(B)(1), §1A(B)(5), § 1A(C), and § 1A(E) (insofar as it enforces § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5), and § 1A(C)) severable from the non-preempted portions of §1A?
The first question: "Is a severability analysis required?" I would answer in the affirmative. However, the Court states that it takes the reasoning applicable to those workers covered by the Railway Labor Act, Civil Service Reform Act, and Postal Reorganization Act, and applies it to workers covered by the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act. Slip. Opin. at 13. I do not agree with this analysis in part, because: (1) The federal court stated that Art. 23 §1A was not applicable in its entirety to workers covered by Railway Labor Act, Civil Service Reform Act, and Postal Reorganization Act, and that only portions of Art. 23 § 1A were invalid as to workers covered by the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act; and (2) The point of the certified questions is whether valid portions (i.e., non-preempted portions) of Art. 23 § 1A may nevertheless apply to workers covered by the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act.
The Court concludes that the valid portions of Art. 23 § 1A apply to all workers to whatever extent they are not preempted. I agree in that result here, but only because of a severability analysis showing that the remaining portions of Art. 23 § 1A are capable of being enforced absent the preempted language. The severability analysis is what shows this capability.
Although the Court's opinion states that a severability analysis is not necessary, I must note that some of the language used by the Court herein is part of a severability analysis used by most courts. For example, the Court's opinion states that a severability analysis is not needed because Art. 23 § 1A was not intended to apply to certain groups of people, i.e., those covered by the Railway Labor Act, Civil Service Reform Act, Postal Reorganization Act. As I explain below, this type of reasoning, non-application of a state law to a particular class, or here, easily identifiable groups of people, is part of a severability analysis.
Cases involving a preemption of state law by federal law frequently involve a severability analysis, and the question of whether the remaining portions of non-preempted state law may remain valid presents a question for a state court to decide. For example in one opinion the High Court explained that a state's law was, as in the case before us today, preempted by federal
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