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Local 514 Transport Workers Union of America v. Keating12/16/2003
ited to those employees who fall under the purview of the LMRA," and (2) Oklahoma's right-to-work law does not include individuals governed by the "RLA, the CSRA, the PRA and federal enclave jurisprudence." Preemption (by invalidation) of the right-to-work amendment was avoided through a statutory construction which restricts application of the amendment to the private labor sector and the area encompassed exclusively by the states.
The drafters of Oklahoma's right-to-work amendment reasonably contemplated and expected the limiting effect of applicable federal law. This is evidenced by the absence of an express or implied intention to avoid conforming or tailoring the text to applicable federal law. Recognizing that federal law does not operate on the universe of labor-management relations, the drafters sought to regulate (1) the narrow area of labor relations governed exclusively by the states, and (2) the federally authorized window opened by LMRA § 164 (b). Because federal labor law is neither stagnant nor mummified in its present form, the drafters understood the outer boundaries of right-to-work amendment must be flexible to remain in conformity with present as well as future federal re-definitions. The restrictions imposed by the district court's pronouncement clearly articulate specific limitations on Oklahoma's right-to-work amendment while allowing the entire text of the amendment to stand available for application in conformity with extant federal law.
The district court's judgment that federal law preempts the text of Article 23 §1A subsections (B) (5) and (C) does not create a lacuna in the amendment. A facial four-corners' examination of the amendment discloses complete survival of the legislation despite federal-law-imposed conditions being placed on the application of the right-to-work amendment. The impact of preemption on the amendment does not leave any unfilled territory that lies within the coverage of the statute, which if present, would call for severability analysis. As no provisions of the right-to-work amendment are constitutionally invalidated by the district court's declaratory judgment, the statutorily defined prerequisite for an employment of severability analysis (that a provision be declared void as unconstitutional) has not been met. The use of that analysis is hence inappropriate.
SUMMERS, J., Concurring in Result and joined by LAVENDER, J.and BOUDREAU, J.
The federal courts in this case have determined that the Oklahoma Right to Work amendment, Okla. Court Art. 23 § 1A, has no application to certain employees, and further was preempted in part by certain federal legislation. The Federal District Court held that even with the invalid and preempted portions out, the Right to Work amendment's core provisions would have still been enacted, and thus withstood judicial severability analysis.
Preemption questions are those of federal law and are not before us today. But severability of a partially invalid set of laws is a state question. I must initially point out that the Court's opinion distinguishing preempted state law from unconstitutionality is incorrect. A state law is unconstitutional when it is preempted by federal legislation. Because the Court's opinion turns on this point, I must point out that the U.S. Supreme Court does not share our Court's view. For example:
Because the state Act's provisions conflict with Congress's specific delegation to the President of flexible discretion, with limitation of sanctions to a limited scope of actions and actors, and with direction to develop a comprehensive, multilateral strategy under the federal Act, it is preempted, and its application is unconstitutional
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