Local 514 Transport Workers Union of America v. Keating12/16/2003
Congress did not intend the validity of the statute in question to depend on the validity of the constitutionally offensive provision. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S., at 932, 103 S.Ct., at 2774; Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S., at 235, 52 S.Ct., at 565. In such a case, unless there is strong evidence that Congress intended otherwise, the objectionable provision can be excised from the remainder of the statute. In the absence of a severability clause, however, Congress' silence is just that-- silence--and does not raise a presumption against severability.
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 94 L.Ed.2d 661 (1987).
Mere legislative silence on the issue of severability may not control the presumption that legislative acts will be enforced to the extent that they are valid.
Part of examining legislative intent is whether the statute, or in this case a constitutional provision, is capable of being enforced without the offending applications. May the valid language be applied to workers not subject to the invalid portions? In our case today, after the invalid portions are removed as to certain workers, Art 23 § 1A states, in part, that:
No person shall be required, as a condition of employment or continuation of employment, to: Become or remain a member of a labor organization; Pay any dues, fees, assessments, or other charges of any kind or amount to a labor organization; Pay to any charity or other third party, in lieu of such payments, any amount equivalent to or pro rata portion of dues, fees, assessments, or other charges regularly required of members of a labor organization;
Further, that any person who directly or indirectly violates these provisions shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. These provisions are capable of being enforced, as a matter of state law, apart from the preempted language.
In Potter v. State, 1973 OK CR 228, 509 P.2d 933, our Court of Criminal Appeals discussed a criminal obscenity statute that created an exemption for certain conduct, specifically, "motion pictures produced or manufactured as commercial motion pictures which (1) have the seal under the Production Code of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.," and certain foreign films. Id. 509 P.2d at 934. The court determined that the exemption was both invalid and severable from the remainder of the statute. Id. 509 P.2d at 935-936. Similarly, we have discussed whether invalid and valid provisions "are so interwoven as to be incapable of distinct separation." Parwal Inv. Co. v. State, 1918 OK 498, 175 P. 514, 515.
In our case today, Article 23 § 1A defines certain conduct as constituting a misdemeanor. Similar to Potter, the conduct which is preempted does not interfere with enforcing the remainder of the non-preempted portion of Art. 23 § 1A that defines certain other conduct. The provisions listing types of conduct are not so interwoven as to be incapable of distinct separation. Parwal Inv. Co. v. State, supra.
This Court has indicated that the intent of a legislative body is for its enactments to be enforced in part, unless either a contrary intent is apparent, or the provisions are not capable of separate enforcement. No party has shown an intent of the People that Art. 23 § 1A should not be enforced, at least in part. The non-preempted language of Art. 23 § 1A is capable of being enforced apart from the preempted language.
19 I would thus answer the two questions in the affirmative. Yes, a severability analysis is required. Yes, the preempted portions are severable from the non-preempted portions. I concur in the Court's result. The non-pree
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