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Laird v. Lockheed Engineering & Sciences Co.3/29/2001
This is a wrongful employment termination case. Appellant/plaintiff Patricia Laird alleges error in the trial court's orders rendering summary judgment in favor of the appellee/defendant, Lockheed Engineering & Sciences Company ("Lockheed"), on her wrongful termination, breach of written contract, breach of oral contract, fraud, and misrepresentation claims. She also alleges the trial court erred when it refused to allow her to depose one of Lockheed's attorneys, Stephen H. Dimlich, Jr. We affirm.
Facts
Laird began work for a Lockheed-related entity in July 1980. With the exception of a brief layoff and maternity leave, she worked for Lockheed until she was laid off on March 3, 1995. Lockheed does not dispute that Laird was a "long service employee" as defined in its written policies.
For approximately five years before she was laid off, Laird was a Contract Administrator. Her position required her to participate in preparing and delivering monthly and quarterly financial reports known as "533 reports," which NASA requires Lockheed to submit pursuant to a contract between the two. Laird and another Lockheed employee, James Mayfield, complained to higher management after they received information that the data included in the reports was "fictitious" because it understated certain costs. Lockheed later laid off both Laird and Mayfield.
Laird contends Lockheed laid her off because she refused to commit fraud on NASA by submitting what she considered to be false reports. In the trial court, Laird initially alleged Lockheed wrongfully terminated her employment in retaliation for allegedly inquiring into whether she was being asked to commit an illegal act. She ultimately amended her petition to include claims for breach of written and oral contract, fraud, and misrepresentation.
In September 1997, the trial court granted Lockheed's motion for summary judgment regarding Laird's wrongful termination claim, but denied it with respect to her oral contract, fraud, and misrepresentation claims. One month later, in October 1997, the trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Lockheed on Laird's written contract claim. Finally, in July 1998, the trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Lockheed on all of Laird's remaining causes of action.
In addition to complaining that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of Lockheed, Laird argues the trial court erred when it quashed the deposition of Stephen H. Dimlich, Jr., one of the attorneys who represents Lockheed.
Standard of Review
A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt. Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). When deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true. Id. at 548-49. We must indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant and resolve any doubts in her favor. Id.; Osborne v. St. Lukes Episcopal Hosp., 915 S.W.2d 906, 911 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
To obtain a summary judgment, a defendant must either: (1) disprove at least one element of the plaintiff's cause of action; or (2) plead and conclusively establish each essential element of its affirmative defense, thereby rebutting the plaintiff's cause of action. See Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995).
Breach of Contract
In her first point of error, Laird argues the trial court erred when it rendered summary judgment in fa
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