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In re Appeal of Denton12/10/2001
Compensation Appeals Board
(New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board)
The petitioner, Peggy Denton, appeals a decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (board) denying her request for interest on medical bills, except those she personally paid. We reverse and remand.
The record supports the following facts. In May 1996, the petitioner sustained an injury while working at Surge Industries Corporation. She filed a workers' compensation claim, which was denied by the employer's carrier, AIG Claim Services, Inc. (AIG), on the basis that the injury did not arise out of her employment. A department of labor hearing officer denied the claim on the same grounds. The petitioner appealed to the board, which found that her injury did arise out of and in the course of her employment. We affirmed the board's decision in December 1998. Appeal of Surge Industries Corporation, No. 97-551 (N.H. December 15, 1998). Thereafter, AIG paid the petitioner's outstanding medical bills, which totaled in excess of $60,000.
In 1999, the petitioner sought an award of interest. The board ordered the payment of "any interest actually accrued on indemnity and permanency awards, excluding medical bills, except when paid out of pocket by the claimant." The board denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.
The petitioner argues that the interest provision of the Workers' Compensation Law, RSA 281-A:44, I (1999), mandates an award of interest on her contested medical bills. RSA 281-A:44, I, provides:
In any dispute over the amount of the benefit payable under this chapter which is appealed to the board or supreme court or both, the employee, if such employee prevails, shall be entitled to reasonable counsel fees and costs as approved by the board or court and interest at the rate of 10 percent per year on that portion of any award the payment of which is contested. The interest shall be computed from the date of injury.
Relying on Appeal of Rainville, 143 N.H. 624 (1999), the petitioner asserts that the "award" contemplated by the statute includes medical bills. She contends that, because she was the prevailing party in a contested award, she is entitled to interest on her medical bills.
We are the final arbiter of legislative intent as expressed in the language of a statute. Appeal of HCA Parkland Medical Ctr., 143 N.H. 92, 94 (1998). In construing a statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to words used, considering the statute as a whole and interpreting it consistent with its purpose. Id. At issue here is the Workers' Compensation Law, which we construe liberally, "resolving all reasonable doubts in statutory construction in favor of the injured employee in order to give the broadest reasonable effect to its remedial purpose." Rainville, 143 N.H. at 627 (quotation omitted).
The Workers' Compensation Law does not define "award." See RSA 281-A:2 (Supp. 2000). Therefore, it is appropriate to examine whether the term has been interpreted by this court. In Rainville, we construed "award" to include medical benefits in the context of RSA 281-A:43, I(b) (Supp. 1998), the section of the statute pertaining to payment of awards pending appeal. Rainville, 143 N.H. at 628. "Words used with plain meaning in one part of a statute are to be given the same meaning in other parts of the statute, unless a contrary intention is clearly shown." Appeal of Town of Conway, 121 N.H. 372, 373 (1981) (quotation, brackets and ellipses omitted). In examining the statute, we find no indication that the legislature intended the word "award" to have different meanings in sections :43, I(b) and :44, I.
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