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Mendez v. District of Columbia3/27/2003
Argued February 27, 2003
D.C. Code § 32-1503 (a-1) (2001) (formerly D.C. Code § 36-303 (a-1)) declares that " o employee shall receive [workers'] compensation under this chapter and at any time receive compensation under the workers' compensation law of any other state for the same injury or death." The Director of the Department of Employment Services (DOES) affirmed an order of a hearing examiner discontinuing workers' compensation benefits petitioner was receiving after the examiner found that petitioner had received compensation for the same injury under the law of Maryland. Petitioner challenges that decision by contending that principles of res judicata bar his employer, who did not raise the issue of double compensation at the hearing on his eligibility for benefits under District law, from invoking the statutory disqualification at a later time. We affirm.
I.
Petitioner, a Virginia resident, was employed by Chamberlin-Washington, Inc. ("Chamberlin"), a Maryland corporation, to do work throughout the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. On July 15, 1999, while working in the District of Columbia, petitioner fell from a scaffolding and was injured. He filed a claim for temporary total disability benefits in the District for the period beginning July 15, 1999, and continuing. At a November 1999 hearing on the claim, Chamberlin disputed it on the sole ground that petitioner's work in the District of Columbia had been "temporary and intermittent," see D.C. Code § 32-1503 (a-3) (2001), thus disqualifying him for benefits in the District. A hearing examiner rejected this argument and, in a February 2000 order, awarded petitioner the requested benefits, which Chamberlin began paying without further challenge.
In April or May of 2000, however, Chamberlin (through its insurance carrier, Travelers) informed DOES of the fact that petitioner had applied for and received workers' compensation benefits for the same injury from the Maryland Injured Workers Insurance Fund (MIWIF), covering the period from July 15, 1999, through November 9 of that year. Chamberlin moved for review and termination of the District compensation award under D.C. Code § 32-1524 (a)(1) (formerly D.C. Code § 36-324 (a)(1)). This statute permits DOES, "upon own initiative or upon application of a party in interest," to review and modify or terminate a compensation order up to one year after receipt of the last payment, where "a change of conditions has occurred which raises issues concerning . . . he fact or the degree of disability or the amount of compensation payable pursuant thereto." Petitioner's receipt of compensation from Maryland for the same injury, Chamberlin argued, was a "change of conditions" that disqualified him from receiving further benefits in the District for the injury by operation of D.C. Code § 32-1503 (a-1).
At a hearing on Chamberlin's application, petitioner's receipt of the Maryland benefits was essentially undisputed. The DOES hearing examiner found that the payments had been received, and agreed with Chamberlin's argument that discovery of the payments was a "change of condition" affecting the amount of compensation properly payable to petitioner. He therefore terminated petitioner's District benefits prospectively in accordance with § 32-1503 (a-1). (Chamberlain had not sought recoupment of benefits already paid.) The Director agreed with the examiner's analysis, stating that, since the employer was contesting the amount of benefits properly payable to petitioner, " he [examiner's] application of D.C. Code § [32-1524] to the instant case was appropriate and in accordance with the law," and that § 32-1503 (a-1) compelled termination of the benefits in the
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