Delaney v. International Union UAW Local No. 94 of John Deere Manufacturing Co.2/25/2004
, 94 S.Ct. at 2781, 2782, 41 L.Ed. 2d at 762-63 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed. 2d. 789, 805 (1974)).
The Court, however, warned "use of this writing or other similar rhetoric in a labor dispute could be actionable, particularly if some of its words were taken out of context in such a way as to convey a false representation of fact." Id. at 286, 94 S.Ct. at 2782, 41 L.Ed. 2d at 763. That is, a state law defamation claim is not preempted if the plaintiffs show the defendant made a false statement of fact with "actual malice," i.e. with a knowing or reckless disregard of the truth. " t must be emphasized that malicious libel enjoys no constitutional protection in any context.... The malicious utterance of defamatory statements in any form cannot be condoned...." Linn, 383 U.S. at 63, 86 S.Ct. at 663, 15 L.Ed. 2d at 590. Lower courts have thus permitted state tort actions where there is a false representation of fact and "actual malice" is shown. See, e.g., Kirk v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 934 F. Supp. 775, 790 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' defamation claim where plaintiffs generated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants had falsely accused plaintiffs of appropriating union funds for personal use).
2. Application
The parties agree the defendants' use of "scab," standing alone, cannot support the plaintiffs' defamation claim in light of Letter Carriers. The plaintiffs are nonunion workers and are therefore "scabs," as that derogatory term is generally understood. See Letter Carriers, 418 U.S at 283, 94 S.Ct. at 2780, 41 L.Ed. 2d at 761 ("One of the generally accepted definitions of 'scab' is 'one who refuses to join a union.'") (citation omitted); Dunn v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n., 193 F.3d 1185, 1193, n.7 (11th Cir. 1999) (same); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2022 (2002) (same). Federal labor law preempts plaintiffs' defamation claim, insofar as the latter are based upon factually true assertions that the plaintiffs are "scabs." Letter Carriers, 418 U.S at 283, 94 S.Ct. at 2780, 41 L.Ed. 2d at 761; see also Dunn, 193 F.3d at 1194-95 (summary judgment properly granted for airline pilots who crossed picket lines because scab list is, in itself, factually true and preempted by federal law); Cline v. McLeod, 349 S.E.2d 232, 234-35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (local union's scab letter protected by NLRA and state defamation claim preempted). Indeed, if nothing more were alleged, the plaintiffs' defamation claim would, at any rate, fail purely on state law grounds. Truth is a complete defense to defamation. Huegerich v. IBP, Inc., 547 N.W.2d 216, 221 (Iowa 1996).
Nor are the newsletter's references to the plaintiffs as "freeloaders" actionable. A "freeloader" is defined as one who "impose upon another's generosity... without sharing in the cost or responsibility involved...." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 906 (2002). Again, this is a crude but true statement about the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs strenuously point out, however, that the newsletter once employed the past tense when it characterized the plaintiffs as freeloaders. Namely, the July 1, 1999 edition of the newsletter stated the plaintiffs "haven't contributed anything or walked the picket line to get this or any other benefit that we have worked for," when the plaintiffs had in the past paid dues and gone on strike.
This statement, however, cannot be viewed in isolation with a grammar book at one's side. When viewed in context of the newsletter's campaign against the plaintiffs, this statement plainly indicates the plaintiffs, a
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