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Velez v. City of Jersey City6/29/2004
iability only for public entities under the Act. It does not limit the necessity of notice. When defining the parameters of notice in the 1994 amendments, the Legislature sought to bring the "injury" caused by the public entity or public employee under the umbrella of the Act's notice requirements. We are convinced that if the Legislature intended to exclude intentional torts from the notice requirements, it would have expressly done so when it amended N.J.S.A. 59:8-3 and 59:8-8. It did not.
Our interpretation of the Act is consistent with prior cases in which courts have concluded that the Act's notice requirements apply to conduct that arguably could be classified as the intentional or outrageous conduct described in N.J.S.A. 59:3-14. See Epstein v. State, 311 N.J. Super. 350, 355-56 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 155 N.J. 589 (1998) (barring claims for malicious prosecution, libel, slander, defamation, and emotional distress due to failure to file timely notice of claim with local public entities); Dunn v. Borough of Mountainside, 301 N.J. Super. 262, 275-76 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 402 (1998) (noting that under post-1994 Act, plaintiff's sexual assault claim against police officer would be barred due to failure to file timely notice of claim); Pisano v. City of Union City, 198 N.J. Super. 588, 590 (Law Div. 1984) (determining that claims of false arrest and false imprisonment must be presented to public entities within ninety days after accrual and are barred by the Act after two years have lapsed); Garlanger v. Berbeke, 223 F. Supp. 2d 596, 602 (D.N.J. 2002) (noting Act's notice requirement applicable to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution and false arrest); Rolax v. Whittman, 175 F. Supp. 2d 720, 730 (D.N.J. 2001) (holding Act's notice requirement applicable to battery claim).
We recognize that in limited circumstances, the Court has held that the Act's notice requirements are inapplicable to tort actions against a public entity or a public employee. For instance, in Fuchilla, supra, the Court addressed whether the Act's notice provisions applied to discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. ยง 1983, and the LAD. 109 N.J. at 332-338. After reviewing the history, purpose, and provisions of both the Act and the LAD, id. at 332-37, the Court concluded that "the Legislature did not intend that claims of discrimination be subject to the notice requirements of the Act," id. at 337-38.
Similarly, in Greenway Dev. Co. v. Borough of Paramus, 163 N.J. 546 (2000), the Court addressed whether the Act's notice requirements applied to an action for inverse condemnation. The Court held that because inverse condemnation is not an "injury" within the meaning of the Act, the notice provisions were not applicable. Id. at 557. Further, the Court noted that even if inverse condemnation were an injury, " public entity may not use a state statute, such as the , to abrogate a claimant's constitutional rights." Id. at 557-58.
However, unlike the LAD claims in Fuchilla, the tort claims at issue here are not statutory causes of action with specific procedural requirements and greater damage allowances than available at common law. Nor do the claims assert any state or federal constitutional rights that would supercede statutory limitations, such as in Greenway. Instead, these claims are basic common law tort claims, and we find no justification to conclude that the Legislature intended to exclude them from the Act's notice requirements.
Finally, we reject the State's invitation to extend the Act's notice requirements to mandate that written notice also be given to p
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