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Velez v. City of Jersey City6/29/2004
provisions do not distinguish between negligence claims and intentional torts. Ibid. Rather, the Act "states that ' o action shall be brought against a public entity or public employee under this ct unless the claim upon which it is based shall have been presented in accordance with the procedure set forth in this chapter.'" Id. at 520-21 (quoting N.J.S.A. 59:8-3) (alterations in original). Third, the panel found that requiring notice in actions against a public employee is consistent with the purpose of the notice provisions, allowing a public entity an opportunity to correct the practices giving rise to the claim. Id. at 521 (citing Beauchamp, supra, 164 N.J. at 121-22). The panel concluded that proper notice would provide a public entity "with an opportunity to investigate the claims, and take disciplinary or other appropriate action to rectify inappropriate behavior or flawed practices, if necessary, regardless of whether the [public entity] is liable for damages." Ibid. Finally, the panel reasoned that requiring notice would "give a public entity an opportunity to determine whether it will indemnify the [accused] employee," despite the fact that it may be immune from liability. Ibid.
We are in substantial accord with Judge Winklestein's analysis in Bonitsis, and with the conclusion that the notice provisions in the Act apply to causes of action based on the intentional conduct of a public employee.
N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 was amended in 1994 to require a complaining party to give a public entity notice of " claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury or damage to person or to property" against a public entity or public employee. Otherwise, " he claimant shall be forever barred from recovering against a public entity or public employee." Ibid. The Act defines injury as "death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property or any other injury that a person may suffer that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person." N.J.S.A. 59:1-3. This "statutory definition is expansive and unqualified." Ayers, supra, 106 N.J. at 575.
Prior to the 1994 amendment, the Court did not answer whether this statutory definition of injury was so expansive as to include injuries resulting from intentional torts as well as negligence. Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 335, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 826, 109 S.Ct. 75, 102 L.Ed. 2d 51 (1988). We now answer that question in the affirmative. We conclude that the absence of any reference to negligence within the definition of "injury" is consistent with the Legislature's intent that the Act's notice requirements encompass injuries arising from intentional conduct as well as negligent conduct. In our view, this interpretation furthers the Act's two central purposes: (1) restricting a public entity's liability in tort, and (2) creating a relatively short notice filing period "so [a public entity can] investigate and settle claims." Id. at 336.
Under N.J.S.A. 59:3-14, a public employee is not immune if he or she engaged in conduct that "constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct." However, that provision must be read together with the overall mandate of N.J.S.A. 59:8-3, that " o action shall be brought against a public entity or public employee under this ct unless the claim ... presented in accordance with the procedure set forth in this ." We discern nothing in the Act's legislative history or statutory scheme that indicates the Legislature intended the notice requirements to apply solely to claims based in negligence. Although the Act's pre-amendment legislative declaration only mentions negligence, this does not contradict our holding because the declaration defines the parameters of mandatory l
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