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Elrod v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund6/8/2004
ll be governed by the law of civil actions . . .. The statute of limitations contained in this section is one of extinction and not of repose.
Workers' compensation is statutory. Greenlee v. Duke Plastering Service, 75 S.W.3d 273, 276 (Mo. banc 2002). This Court ascertains the intent of the legislature by the plain and ordinary meaning of the law. Id. This Court "use rules of statutory construction that subserve rather than subvert legislative intent. In addition, we will not construe the statute so as to work unreasonable, oppressive, or absurd results." Kincade v. Treasurer of the State of Mo., 92 S.W.3d 310, 311 (Mo. App. 2002). This Court's review of the interpretation of the statute is de novo. Section 287.495; Endicott v. Display Technologies, Inc., 77 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Mo. banc 2002).
The purpose of workers' compensation is to compensate workers for job-related injuries. Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 72 (Mo. banc 1998). The law is liberally construed with a view to the public welfare. Section 287.800. Substantial compliance is sufficient to give effect to the Commission's awards. Id.
An employee may file against the Fund within one year after "a claim is filed against an employer." The Fund argues that "a claim" means the original claim against an employer -- which Elrod filed on May 30, 1995. Her "amended" claim against the Fund was filed on November 3, 1998 -- over three years later. Under the Fund's interpretation, the claim is time-barred as to it, because the claim was not filed within "two years after the date of the injury or within one year after a claim is filed against an employer or insurer." Section 287.430.
Section 287.430, however, does not say "original claim," or even "the claim." Moreover, the workers' compensation statutes and regulations never mention the concept "amended claim." The statute employs "a claim," which includes any timely claim. Kincade, 92 S.W.3d at 312.
The Fund's reading contradicts the statutory policy of workers' compensation. The Fund would often require a claimant to prove that "the combined effect of the primary and prior injuries will be permanently disabling without the benefit of sufficient recovery time or sufficient time for rehabilitation." Kincade, 92 S.W.3d at 312. This violates the purpose of workers' compensation--to compensate for employment-related injuries and encourage employment of the partially handicapped. See Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72; Grant v. Neal, 381 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Mo. 1964).
For purposes of 287.430, Elrod's claim against her employer was the amended claim of November 3, 1998--which simultaneously added the Fund. This was a bona fide claim, which reported more "parts of body injured." Elrod did not amend or supplement the original claim solely to extend the statute of limitations in section 287.430. The claim against the Fund is not time-barred.
III.
According to the Fund, the Commission's award of permanent-partial disability is not supported by sufficient competent evidence that Elrod's pre-existing disability and work-related injury combined for a greater disability than the sum of individual disabilities. Elrod cross-appeals, requesting permanent-total disability, not permanent-partial disability, because she cannot return to reasonable employment.
This Court defers to the Commission on issues of fact. Section 287.495 RSMo; Endicott, 77 S.W.3d at 615. The award is upheld unless the Commission acted beyond its power, the award was procured by fraud, the facts do not support the award, or the award is not supported by sufficient competent evidence in the record. Section 287.495.1.
To establish permanent-pa
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