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Lind v. City of Battle Creek6/11/2004
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
Plaintiff, a white police officer, alleges that defendant violated the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2202(1)(a), when it promoted a black officer, rather than plaintiff, to the supervisory position of police sergeant on the basis of race. The issue is whether such a claim of "reverse discrimination" must satisfy standards different from those required of other claims of discrimination. Having granted leave to appeal and heard argument, this Court concludes as follows:
(1) MCL 37.2202(1)(a) provides that " n employer shall not . . . discriminate against an individual with respect to employment . . . because of . . . race . . . ."
(2) MCL 37.2202(1)(a) draws no distinctions between "individual" plaintiffs on account of race.
(3) The Court of Appeals, in reliance on Allen v Comprehensive Health Services , 222 Mich App 426, 429-433; 564 NW2d 914 (1997), held that a "majority" plaintiff in a "reverse discrimination" case, in order to make a prima facie showing, must, in addition to satisfying the obligations of "minority" plaintiffs in discrimination cases, also present "background circumstances supporting the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority . . . ."
(4) Allen draws a distinction between plaintiffs on account of race under MCL 37.2202(1)(a), and is thus inconsistent with our Civil Rights Act. Therefore, Allen is overruled.
In response to Justice Cavanagh's dissent, we observe that this opinion is short, not because we disagree with the dissent concerning the significance of this issue, but because Allen is so clearly contrary to the language of Michigan's Civil Rights Act. We are uncertain how many pages the dissent believes are required to explain that "individual" means "individual." Further, we note that in its much longer opinion, the dissent, unlike the majority, never actually bothers to decide the issue before this Court -- whether Allen's "background circumstances" standard is consistent with Michigan's Civil Rights Act.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Stephen J. Markman, Maura D. Corrigan, Elizabeth A. Weaver, Clifford W. Taylor, Robert P. Young, Jr.
YOUNG, J. ( concurring ).
I fully concur in the majority opinion, but write separately to note, on this fiftieth anniversary of the decision in Brown v Bd of Education , how singular and troubling is the dissenting view of my two colleagues.
It is hard to reconcile the logic of the dissenters' position when juxtaposed to the language of our Michigan Civil Rights Act and our state constitution without recalling Orwell's chilling refrain: "all [citizens] are equal, but some [citizens] are more equal than others."
Fifty years after the United States Supreme Court declared in Brown that the government could no longer use consideration of race to disadvantage any of its citizens, our two dissenting colleagues have announced precisely the contrary position. Our dissenting colleagues have advocated that the judicial branch of government require persons of one race to bear a higher burden of maintaining an employment discrimination case than persons born of another race.
This is a concept worth repeating for emphasis, for no citizen of this state should miss the import of the dissents' view. Our dissenting colleagues maintain that, under a statute that explicitly prohibits employment discrimination "because of" race, some Michigan citizens must bear a higher burden to maintai
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