Arroyo v. Board of Education of Howard County6/10/2004
2002, petitioner filed this separate civil complaint against both the County Board and Howard County, Maryland. In his complaint, petitioner alleges that he was wrongfully terminated from employment with the County Board because of his action of filing, on August 7, 1995, a workers' compensation claim. The central dispute at issue, however, is, as presented to this Court, whether this complaint is barred by the general statute of limitations.
II. Standard of Review
In reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, we are concerned with whether a dispute of material fact exists. Todd v. MTA, 373 Md. 149, 154-55, 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., 335 Md. 135, 144, 642 A.2d 219, 224 (1994); Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 255, 630 A.2d 1156, 1160 (1993); Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 737, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1992); Arnold Developer, Inc. v. Collins, 318 Md. 259, 262, 567 A.2d 949, 951 (1990); Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 408, 559 A.2d 365, 366 (1989); King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 110-11, 492 A.2d 608, 614 (1985) (citations omitted). "A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case." King, 303 Md. at 111, 492 A.2d at 614 (citing Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8, 327 A.2d 502, 509 (1974)). " dispute as to facts relating to grounds upon which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment." Salisbury Beauty Schs. v. State Bd. of Cosmetolo- gists, 268 Md. 32, 40, 300 A.2d 367, 374 (1973)).
This Court also has stated that "the standard of review for a grant of summary judgment is whether the trial court was legally correct." Goodrich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185, 204, 680 A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996); see also Murphy v. Merzbacher, 346 Md. 525, 530-31, 697 A.2d 861, 864 (1997); Hartford Ins. Co., 335 Md. at 144, 642 A.2d at 224; Gross, 332 Md. at 255, 630 A.2d at 1160; Heat & Power Corp., Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 592, 578 A.2d 1202, 1206 (1990) (citations omitted). The trial court, in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-501(e), shall grant a motion for summary judgment "if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that [the moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (alteration added). The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the case or to decide the factual disputes, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact which is sufficiently material to be tried. See Goodwich, 343 Md. at 205-06, 680 A.2d at 1077; Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291 Md. 241, 247, 434 A.2d 564, 567-68 (1981); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 304, 413 A.2d 170, 171 (1980). Thus, once the moving party has provided the court with sufficient grounds for summary judgment, the non-moving party must produce sufficient evidence to the trial court that a genuine dispute as to a material fact exists. See, e.g., Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington County Nat'l Sav. Bank, 297 Md. 691, 712, 467 A.2d 758, 769 (1983). This requires "produc facts under oath, based on the personal knowledge of the affiant to defeat the motion. Bald, unsupported state- ments or conclusions of law are insufficient." Id. (alteration added). With these considerations in mind, we turn to the case sub judice.
III. Discussion
Md. Code (1978, 2001 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.), ยง 6-202 (a) of the Education Article, sets forth the reasons and procedures by which certain educational employees in this State, including those employed by HCPSS, can be suspended from their employment or dismiss
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