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Arroyo v. Board of Education of Howard County6/10/2004
rative decision regarding whether petitioner was to be terminated from his employment was left to the discretion of the State Board, which, in an "opinion" dated May 28, 1998, affirmed the decision of the County Board. It was this decision, and not that of the County Board, that conclusively terminated petitioner's employment with HCPSS as an administrative matter. Petitioner's employment with HCPSS, as far as the agency was concerned, was effectively over after this decision by the State Board, a decision which, as we stated earlier, exhausted his administrative remedies. It was this decision on May 28th that constituted the final administrative decision. While we have not directly addressed this issue in relevant context in our cases, it is clear that there was nothing left for the State Board to do, and it is thus from at least this point that the statute of limitations began to run. Some other jurisdictions have more directly addressed the issue. One has resolved the exact issue.
In Krecek v. Board of Police Commissioners of La Grange Park, 271 Ill.App.3d 418, 646 N.E.2d 1314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), the Illinois appellate court stated:
"Next, plaintiff contends that her claims are not time- barred because the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies tolls the statute of limitations and the presentation of an administrative claim interrupts all applicable statutes of limitations. Plaintiff bases those claims on the assertion that she exhausted her available administrative remedies on June 5, 1992, when the trial court resolved her administrative review case.
"Plaintiff is mistaken. Her administrative remedies were exhausted before she filed her complaint for judicial review of the administrative action. Exhaustion of all administrative remedies occurs when a final administrative decision is rendered. In this case, all administrative remedies were exhausted on September 12, 1991, when the Board of Commissioners issued the final administrative decision of termination."
Id. at 426, 646 N.E.2d at 1320 (citations omitted).
In Snoddy v. McKune, 31 Kan.App.2d 579, 68 P.3d 168 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003), the Kansas Court of Appeals stated:
"Here, . . . it appears the Secretary's initial review is the final possible administrative remedy available. Therefore, Snoddy had exhausted all administrative remedies . . . . Accordingly, because [a Kansas statute] only allows for tolling of the statute of limitations when an individual is attempting to exhaust administrative remedies, Snoddy's argument must fail. . . . Snoddy's letter cannot be construed as an attempt to exhaust administrative remedies, because he had no further administrative remedies to exhaust. Therefore, the statute of limitations should not have been tolled, and his petition was untimely."
Id. at 583, 68 P.3d at 171 (alteration added) (citations omitted).
In Cooper v. Minor, 16 S.W.3d 578 (Mo. 2000), the Supreme Court of Missouri stated, in relevant part:
"Thus, the remedy provided by the legislature for circumstances where an individual is unable to exhaust his or her administrative remedies prior to the running of the statute of limitation is a stay of a timely filed lawsuit, not the tolling of a statute of limitations. Appellant makes no showing why he did not file suit after his grievance was initially denied on September 30, 1997, or that he attempted to timely file suit and seek a stay pending his second grievance appeal."
Id. at 582.
For the reasons we have stated the three-year statute of limitations on petitioner's wrongful termination claim began to run no later than May 28, 1998.
Petitioner, relying o
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