Mercer v. Rodriquez6/8/2004
subject matter jurisdiction on that basis. Id., 538. "The provision does not defeat federal-court jurisdiction, it merely defers it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Steele v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Richardson v. Goord, supra, 347 F.3d 431; Casanova v. Dubois, 289 F.3d 142 (1st Cir. 2002); Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1156, 121 S. Ct. 1106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 977 (2001); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, (3d Cir. 2000); Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 1195 S. Ct. 809, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (1999); Wright v. Morris, 111 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 1997).
In this action, the plaintiff sought relief under the rehabilitation and disabilities acts. Section 12202 of title 42 of the United States Code provides in relevant part: "A state shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter...." (Emphasis added.) See footnote 7. The rehabilitation act is in accord with 42 U.S.C. § 12202. The federal statutes grant the plaintiff the right to commence an action in a state court.
The Superior Court is a constitutional court, the jurisdiction of which is defined by law. Conn. Const. art. V, § 1. "The Superior Court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of action, except such actions over which the courts of probate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute...." General Statutes § 51-164s. Indeed, the Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear administrative appeals involving claims arising under the disabilities and rehabilitation acts. See, e.g., Unified School District No. 1 v. Dept. of Education, 64 Conn. App. 273, 780 A.2d 154, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 910, 782 A.2d 1253 (2001); Gedney v. Board of Education, 47 Conn. App. 297, 703 A.2d 804 (1997), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 968, 707 A.2d 1268 (1998), respectively.
Although the Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear cases concerning prison conditions arising under federal law, a prisoner may bring such an action only after he has exhausted such administrative remedies as are available. Here, the court dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims, the dismissal was procedurally improper. Nevertheless, we find that the dismissal was harmless based on our Supreme Court's holding in Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).
In Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC, our Supreme Court determined that the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant city and the defendant building official for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was improper. Id., 497. The court, nonetheless, found that the dismissal was harmless. It reasoned that the plaintiff's claims were subject to a motion to strike on the ground of legal insufficiency and that the plaintiff's ability to amend after a motion to strike would have been unavailing. Id., 497-502; see also McCutcheon & Burr, Inc. v. Berman, 218 Conn. 512, 527-28, 590 A.2d 438 (1991) (although trial court should have treated motion to dismiss as motion to strike, procedural irregularity was harmless because plaintiff could not demonstrate that it could amend complaint to avoid original deficiencies). Applying the aforesaid reasoning to the present case, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, although it was founded on an improper reason.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurre
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Connecticut Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|