 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Goodyear v. Discala6/8/2004
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 31-293 (a) confers standing on an employer, which is seeking reimbursement of workers' compensation benefits paid to an employee, to intervene in the employee's legal malpractice action against the employee's former attorneys for their failure to pursue a personal injury claim against the tortfeasor who caused the employee's compensable injury. We conclude that it does not and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The facts are not in dispute. On August 8, 1995, the plaintiff, William Goodyear, sustained injuries in an automobile accident when a truck operated by Tony Gavilanes, the tortfeasor, struck the plaintiff's automobile. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff and Gavilanes both were acting in their capacities as employees of the intervening plaintiff, the city of Norwalk (city).
The plaintiff retained the legal services of the defendants, Francis J. Discala and Francis J. Discala, Jr., of Discala and Associates, to represent him in connection with personal injury claims arising from the accident. The defendants successfully recovered workers' compensation benefits for the plaintiff pursuant to § 31-293 (a). Section 31-293 (a), however, also authorizes an employee to bring an action against any third person who causes the injury that forms the basis of the workers' compensation award, and the defendants failed to pursue such a claim against Gavilanes on behalf of the plaintiff.
After becoming aware of the defendants' inaction and subsequent to the expiration of the two year statute of limitations for negligence claims, the plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action against the defendants seeking to recover monetary damages for breach of contract and negligence. Thereafter, the trial court granted the city's motion to intervene in the plaintiff's legal malpractice action to obtain reimbursement of the workers' compensation benefits that it had paid to the plaintiff from any future damages awarded to the plaintiff in his action against the defendants.
The trial court subsequently granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the city's intervening complaint for lack of standing. The city appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
The standard of review for a motion to dismiss is well settled. We often have recognized that " motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dyous v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 264 Conn. 766, 773, 826 A.2d 138 (2003); accord Blumenthal v. Barnes, 261 Conn. 434, 442, 804 A.2d 152 (2002); Brookridge District Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 607, 611, 793 A.2d 215 (2002). Because such a determination involves "a question of law, our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dyous v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, supra, 773.
With respect to the issue of standing, we previously have noted that, " hen standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Orange, 256 Conn. 557, 568, 775 A.2d 284 (2001). "Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion"; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 567-68; and "implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 567. A party "cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] h
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Connecticut Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|