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Klippi v. Lord6/24/2004
to Klippi's friend. As such, they are not defamatory as a matter of law, nor do they support a reasonable inference of a defamatory meaning.
Klippi contends she presented evidence of a direct statement by Laughlin that Klippi was using drugs. In fact, the only evidence that Laughlin stated directly to O'Callaghan that Klippi was abusing drugs comes from Klippi herself. But Klippi's testimony is hearsay as to what Laughlin said, and does not, therefore, create a triable issue of fact. (California Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1, 48-50.) Since O'Callaghan did not confirm Klippi's account of the communication, at best Klippi's account of her telephone conversation with O'Callaghan only establishes that O'Callaghan made out of court statements to Klippi which may not be considered for their truth.
In sum, O'Callaghan's account of the conversation raises no triable issue of material fact, and the court correctly granted summary adjudication of Klippi's defamation claim.
C. Klippi Failed to Establish the Elements of Her Constructive Discharge Claim.
Klippi contends she raised triable issues of material fact that she suffered retaliation, including being constructively discharged, in violation of public policy for protesting unlawful conduct. We disagree.
Our Supreme Court has established a rigorous standard for a cause of action for constructive wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238 (Turner).) In order to establish a constructive discharge, the plaintiff must present evidence "that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee's resignation that a reasonable employer would realize that a reasonable person in the employee's position would be compelled to resign." (Id. at p. 1251; see also Mullins v. Rockwell Internat. Corp. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 731,737.) The employee must show the resignation was coerced, not that it was simply one rational option for the employee. (Turner, supra, at p. 1246.) Thus, "an employee cannot simply `quit and sue,' claiming he or she was constructively discharged." (Ibid.)
Klippi's constructive wrongful discharge claim is fatally flawed because she failed to raise a triable issue of material fact sufficient to meet the objective standard by which a constructive discharge is to be determined. (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247.) None of the working conditions Klippi has described may be considered "extraordinary," "egregious," "unusually `aggravated,'" or amount to a "`continuous pattern,'" and Klippi presented no evidence that she informed LBB her working conditions were intolerable. (Ibid.)
Klippi appears to rely on three kinds of allegedly intolerable conditions that she claims precipitated her resignation on July 16, 2001: (1) Laughlin's demand that Klippi illegally fabricate a client file for production pursuant to a court order, and Laughlin's extreme anger with Klippi when Klippi refused to comply; (2) Laughlin's allegedly defamatory communication to O'Callaghan in retaliation for Klippi's refusal to fabricate the file; and (3) Klippi's perception that after she complained to LBB about Laughlin's conversation with O'Callaghan, she was ostracized by the partners and associates, she became the subject of rumors and gossip, Laughlin planted fabricated evidence to establish Klippi's work had deteriorated, she was not given any work by the firm and her practice was transferred to Laughlin, and she was told that she had no future at the firm, she would not make partner and she should lea
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