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Stenger v. LLC Corp.12/20/2004
FOR PUBLICATION
Joyce Stenger appeals from the trial court's order granting LLC Corp. d/b/a Saturn of Fishers's ("Saturn") motion to strike her request for attorney's fees, raising the following issue for review: whether a plaintiff in a claim brought under the federal Magnuson Moss Warranty Act ("Warranty Act") may recover attorney's fees as a prevailing party after judgment is entered pursuant to a settlement agreement that is silent on attorney's fees.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February 2002, Stenger purchased a vehicle from Saturn. After numerous unsuccessful attempts to have Saturn fix problems with the vehicle, Stenger filed suit in October 2002 alleging a breach of implied warranty and the revocation of her acceptance pursuant to the Warranty Act. Her complaint included a prayer for damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Saturn filed a counterclaim alleging that Stenger's claim was frivolous, but the trial court later dismissed it. In February 2004, fifteen days prior to trial, Saturn tendered, pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 68, an offer of judgment to Stenger which stated, "[Saturn] allows Joyce Stenger to take judgment against it in the amount of $8000.00." Appellant's Appendix at 52. That same day, Stenger notified the court that she accepted the settlement offer by stating: "Plaintiff hereby accepts Defendant[']s Offer of Judgment and moves this court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $8,000 pursuant to Plaintiff's claims brought under the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §2301 et seq." Id. at 53. Accordingly, the trial court executed an entry of judgment for $8,000 the following day.
On February 16, 2004, Stenger filed her petition for attorney's fees. Saturn responded with a motion to strike, which the trial court granted. Stenger now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Stenger contends that the trial court erred in granting Saturn's motion to strike her request for attorney's fees because she was entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party under the Warranty Act following the trial court's entry of judgment pursuant to the parties' agreement. In part, the Warranty Act provides:
"If a consumer finally prevails in any action brought under paragraph (1) of this subsection, he may be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of cost and expenses (including attorneys' fees based on actual time expended) determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action, unless the court in its discretion shall determine that such an award of attorneys' fees would be inappropriate."
15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d)(2). Thus, under the Warranty Act, a "prevailing party" is entitled to recover attorney's fees. Although the Warranty Act is silent as to whether a party accepting an offer of judgment constitutes a "prevailing party," Stenger cites examples where settling plaintiffs have been found to be prevailing parties under other federal fee-shifting statutes that allow a prevailing party in a litigation to seek attorney's fees and costs once a decision on the merits, including an entry of judgment pursuant to an agreement, has been reached. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed. 2d 855 (2001) (interpreting Fair Housing Amendments Act and Americans with Disabilities Act).
Saturn, by contrast, relies on T.R. 68, which provides in part:
"At any time more than ten days before the tr
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